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Given that drug innovation has been largely away from breakthroughs, arguing that a new
drug recently approved and reaching the market is downright effective, safe and afford-
able is actually parlous. The soaring costs of an increasing number of new drugs (specially
for cancer and rare diseases) threaten to supersede societal absorbing capacity, competing
with other health and outside health sector resources. Some health systems are not making
headways towards solving the current conundrum of keeping path with the state of the art
regulatory mechanisms in delivering cost-effective, equitable and affordable treatments.
Thewaypricingandreimbursementdecisionshavebeenmade inSpain regarding the recent
wave of new drugs against the hepatitis C virus could be one case in point. This paper anal-
yses the path of decision-making and the positioning of the relevant actors in this case, that
has set a cumbersome precedent (earmarked fund) for the Spanish National Health Service.
It also stresses the need for current decision-makingmechanisms on approval, pricing, cov-
erage and reimbursement in Spain to move to a transparent regulatory system, avoiding
improvisation and incorporating the highest regulatory standards that other countries have
in place.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access article under
Y-NC-Nthe CC B
. Introduction
The way coverage, pricing and reimbursement deci-
ions have been made in Spain regarding the recent wave
f new drugs against the hepatitis C virus (HCV) shows
ow unprepared is the current architecture of decision
aking to deal with industry and public pressure. In this
aper, decision-making regarding these issues and the role
layed by the relevant actors are analyzed for the Span-
sh national health system (SNS). This case highlights the
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urgent need for current Spanish decision-making mecha-
nisms on approval, pricing, coverage and reimbursement
of new drugs to be overhauled and to make headways
towards a more accountable and transparent health sys-
tem in which incremental cost-effectiveness, value-based
pricing and budget impact become the main prioritization
criteria.
Some salient features of the natural history and
epidemiology of HCV infection warrant highlighting to
critically appraise the recent drug coverage and pricing
decisions made by the Spanish Ministry of Health (MSSSI)
and their consequences (see Box 1).Though very promising, the scientiﬁc evidence on
the last licensed drugs against chronic HCV infection
(simeprevir, sofosbuvir, ombitasvir, daclatasvir, paritapre-
vir, ledipasvir and dasabuvir, and the combination drugs)
access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.
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Box 1: Some clues about HCV infection natural
history and its implications
• According to the disease natural history, the acute
infection resolves spontaneously in 15–40% of
those infected → not all infected people needs treat-
ment (for Spain this has been estimated in the area
of 378,400–584,000 chronic HCV patients)
• When it becomes chronic, progression rate to late
stages of ﬁbrosis (3–4) is very slow (spanning from
5 to over 30 years). Only 15–30% of chronic
patientswillprogress to those late stages (Spanish
estimations amount to 66,700–175,000 patients)
• Secondary prevention strategies tackling factors
known to lower survival, spur disease progression
and decrease the response to drugs against HCV
infection (such as alcohol, obesity, treatment with
insulin, HBV,HIV, druguse, clotting factors andblood
transfusions, chronic hemodialysis) are crucial for
chronic HCV patients in the earlier stages, when liver
damage is still meagre and progression to cirrhosis
can last up to thirty years.
From the system point of view, the relevant
choice is not so much new vs old treatments, but
rather about the timing for therapy: the most
cost-effective option could be putting off medication
against HCV until disease progression has been
Box 2: Why the evidence on efficacy and safety
of the new drugs against chronic HCV infection
is inconclusive:
• although the majority of studies are double-blind
randomized control trials (RCT), some of them are
unblinded, some lack a control group, and some
are non-inferiority trials;
• the follow-up periods are relatively short, what
impedes establishing their mid-long term effective-
ness and safety (i.e. relapses, reinfections, adverse
events);
• they do not include all relevant subgroups of
patients eventually eligible for treatment (given the
disease natural history and current authorized indi-
cations), and may be underpowered;
• the efﬁcacy and safety of all combinations of drugs
currently approved have not been assessed by pow-
ered RCT either;
• the main outcome variable used in the studies –
sustained virological response (SVR) i.e. no trace of
virus in blood – is in fact a surrogate. Even though
it seems appropriate for the clinically relevant end
points of the disease (progression and death), it is
uncertain whether SVR would remain so in the long-
run in all subgroups of patients;
At best, only very few of these studies could
measure up to the evidentiary standards set by
the CONSORT Statement, including the revised
version that encompasses speciﬁc recommen-conﬁrmed.
Sources: [1–7].
still falls short. The series of studies, ofﬁcial documents,
and reports, including the MSSSI therapeutic positioning
reports (TPR) [6–11] currently available are inconclusive
(see Box 2). The lack of concluding pre-approval evidence
about these allegedly life-saving treatments does not imply
lack of efﬁcacy and safety.However, it clearly brings out the
intricate trade-off between premature approval and unjus-
tiﬁed delay, highlighting the deep ﬂaws and inefﬁciencies
of the current binary (yes/no) licensing system.
2. The Spanish regulatory framework
TheSpanishpharmaceuticalmarket hasbeen character-
ized as one heavily regulated and highly subsidized, with
the 80% of all pharmaceutical expenditure coming from
public budget.
To enter the Spanish market, new drugs require
approval through any of these three mechanisms (see
Fig. 1): the only-for-Spain; the mutual acknowledgement
mechanism (the drug is authorized in a particular country
and the other European countries will do so automati-
cally unless any objection is raised within 90 days); and
the centralized approvalmechanism through the European
Medicines Agency (EMA). In addition, reimbursement lia-
bility is ruled by negative lists excluding drugs considered
of low or no therapeutic value [16].
Once a new drug is approved and liable to reim-
bursement, the Inter-Ministerial Pricing Commission for
Pharmaceuticals (CIPM), under the umbrella of the Gen-
eral Directorate for Basic Beneﬁts Basket and Pharmacy
(DGCBSF) in the MSSSI, is responsible for coverage anddations for safety (www.consort-statement.org)
pricing decisions. The centralized price-setting system
comprises two elements: generics reference prices by ther-
apeutic drug group and caps on the prices of new licensed
drugs. Regarding caps, the process relies on controlling
prices “product by product”: through negotiation with the
companies, the agreed price is expected to provide a proﬁt
in the range of 12–18% of the invested capital. In the event
of sales exceeding the predicted volume, prices are to be
lowered toadjustproﬁtswithin theacceptable range.Other
factors might inﬂuence this process such as price index-
ation (price for the same drug in other member state)
[12,13]).
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the global ﬁnancial
crisis, Spain, as many other countries, has implemented
measures to increase efﬁciency in public funding and to
shape the health beneﬁts basket [14]. In that sense, the
Royal Decree Law (RDL 16/2012 20th April [15]) reorga-
nized the SNS basket into selectively co-funded clusters
of beneﬁts [16], and prescribed the mechanism for fur-
ther inclusions or exclusions on the basis of economic
evaluation (incremental cost-effectiveness and budgetary
impact). A major depart from previous functioning, the
RDL encompassed a great deal of expectation among
industry, experts, professionals and the general public;
unfortunately, it was not met with due transparency and,
three years later, the price-setting method under this new
scheme remains unclear.
Although price-setting and approval are exclusive com-
petences of the central government, in the Spanish totally
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evolved health system, drug funding is regional govern-
ents’ responsibility, setting up an annual budget and
aking drugs available to patients. Although decisions on
pproval, reimbursement and coverage are clear enough,
he lack of transparency in price-setting is a noticeable
eakness of the system, and considerations beyond sales
nd proﬁt such as effectiveness in real practice and cost-
ffectiveness or budgetary impact and opportunity costs,
re conﬁned to few local experiments. Clear attribution of
oles for those functions – included in the legislation – to
peciﬁc bodies is absent. This was the lay of the land when
he new drugs against HCV came along.
. The process leading to the decision on new HCV
rugs
In April 2015, the ministries of Health and Finance
greed with the Regional Health Ministries to set up an
ar-marked ﬁnancing plan to secure that all those patients
ulﬁlling approved elegibility criteria are treated with the
ew HCV drugs for at least 12 weeks, emphasizing equity
n access guarantees. The agreement included the unspeci-
edmandate for the assessment of drugs’ effectiveness and
elated health outcomes.
Thespeciﬁcpricingmechanismsapplied for thesenewly
pproveddrugs havenot beendisclosed at this stage either.
s for other therapeutic groups, economic evaluations
ased on Spanish prices are scanty in the purview of these
rugs. Thus, the source for this informationhasbeenmainly
he companies themselves.verage and reimbursement.
The chronology of events leading to the described
ﬁnal arrangement has been bumpy and not always
consistent with rational planning. Fig. 2 shows the
timeline for milestones and decisions about approval
pricing/funding/reimbursement of the new chronic HCV
infection drugs.
Two medications against chronic HCV infection were
approved by EMA – and hence by the Spanish authority
– in 2014: simeprevir (Olysio®, Janssen, NS3/4A protease
inhibitor) and sofosbuvir (Sovaldi®, Gilead, polymerase
inhibitor) [19].
The Ministry of Health decided to include Sovaldi in
the list funded by the SNS from August 2014 [17,18]. This
decision followed a nine-month negotiation between the
Ministry and the pharmaceutical companies to lower the
price. The baseline reference was the European average
cost reaching 60,000 euros. Although no information was
provided at the time, by the end of the year the Ministry
announced a dealwith the two pharmaceutical companies,
reducing the initial marketed price by 58% to settle around
25,000 euros/12 weeks treatment for each drug. No details
were provided as to the criteria applied to yield such ﬁgure.
A national expenditure ceiling was established for the
ﬁrst year: 125 million euros for sofosbuvir and 70 for
simeprevir [19]. In the ﬁrst case, once reaching the ceiling
(aggregated across regional expenditure), the price would
be re-negotiated. As for the second, the agreement foresaw
regional ceilings; in the event of this cap proving insuf-
ﬁcient to cover for local need, the corresponding region
would receive additional treatments free of charge, con-
tingent upon remnant availability within the limits of the
978 C. Campillo-Artero et al. / Health Policy 120 (2016) 975–981
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70 million national ceiling. The regional health and eco-
nomic authorities had to negotiate their ceiling and set
their own budget items on the basis of the estimates of
eligible patients provided by hospitals within their terri-
tory.
According to ofﬁcial announcements, SNS patients
started receiving these two drugs in January 2015 [19,20].
However, regional budgetary and logistic arrangements
were still in process, and thus the actual access to treat-
ment in hospitals was not in total accordance with the
news. By the time of approval for SNS basket in November
2014, patients’ expectations and pressures to be treated
had been escalating, leading to the creation of a protest
platform in early 2015, which organized demonstrations
and sit-in strikes of patients and families at some hospi-
tals to show their growing impatience with the treatment
delivery arrangements; its activity was profusely covered
by mass media [21,22].
In February 2015 – several months after the inclu-
sion decision was made and when the medication was
already available to eligible patients-, the Ministry of
Health summoned an expert committee to develop and
oversee a National Strategy on HCV infection. Though
criteria for appointment were not explicit, the committee
gathered representatives of the Autonomous Communities
(ACs), professional councils, some scientiﬁc societies (pub-
lic health and clinical experts) and patients associations.
The committee established recommendations on the
priority groups of patients who should receive treatment.
They also designed the National Strategic Plan on HCV
infection [23], signed by the ACs by the end of March 2015,
which included four strategic lines. The signedPlanurges to
implement a post-market pharmaco-surveillance system,
but does not include any element regarding economic eval-
uation of the drugs or analysis of their budget impact, nor
any indicationof thebudgetary itemsneeded to implement
the plan itself [23].
In February 2015, the CIPM decided to also include
in the SNS basket the three new combination drugs just
approved by EMA: Harvoni (sofosbuvir and ledipasvir),the new HCV infection drugs.
Viekirax (ombitasvir, paritaprevir, ritonavir) and Exviera
(dasabuvir). To reimburse those new treatments, an addi-
tional national expenditure ceilingof 727millioneuroswas
set. In this case, ACs would receive a 10-year loan at zero
interest to cover for those treatments [24,25]. The Com-
munity of Madrid and the Basque Country opted out of
this arrangement to negotiate ﬁnancing mechanisms on an
individual basis.
Alongside the national expenditure ceiling, other
ﬁnancing schemes were announced: shared risk agree-
ments, a ﬂat rate (the SNS would pay the same regardless
of whether the treatments lasted 12 or more weeks), and a
price-volume agreement. Furthermore, an ofﬁcial commit-
ment to ﬁx the lowest price in Europe for these new drugs
was extended. However, no information as to the content
and scope of these ﬁnancial schemes has been released so
far.
4. The stakeholders come into play
A predictable amount of strategic behaviour has been at
play along this process: producer companies (oligopolists)
and thepublic purchasers (monopsony) gambling for nego-
tiation power against a curtain of organized and heated up
patients and clinicians, holding sustained presence in mass
media and the favour of a public opinion with very low tol-
erance for yet another case of ‘crisis-driven beneﬁts cuts
striking innocent people’. Fig. 3 maps out the relative role
played by stakeholders during the process, which led to
including the new HCV drugs in the SNS basket and setting
an earmarked fund to defray them.
The public negotiator (Ministry of Health) stroke an
“early” deal with the companies; it could have threatened
to wait still a little bit longer, until new drugs entered the
market, thereby eroding the position of the two early com-
ers. This may have encouraged ﬁrms to lean to a fairer
deal, including revisable prices, which, if kept secret, would
even avoid any contagion effect of a disclosed lower price.
However, pharmaceutical companies also had the card
of patients and social sensitivity for them to play hard.
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he public censure against a government leaving patients
ithout a life-saving treatment would clearly offset any
ontempt shown to companies charging abusive prices.
o considerations about budget impact, affordability and
pportunity costs are likely to make their way into public
eliberation under these conditions.
On the other hand, the Ministry is acting as the only
egotiator setting the national prices, but the actual pur-
hasers and funders are the 17 ACs, which have no part
n the negotiation and arrived only lately at the promises
ade by the Ministry to the patients-clinicians protesters.
ntil the new funds and loans are set in motion, so the
nancing schemes announced by the central government
ecome fully clariﬁed and operative, and ﬁnal consen-
us is reached at national level regarding prioritization,
Cs are currently delivering drugs to patients, rearrang-
ng the existing budget items, monitoring expenses with
egard to the national expenditure ceiling, and trying
o reach agreements with pharmaceutical companies to
chieve additional price discounts and other advantages
n a regional basis. All this is being done in a rush and with
onsiderable doses of improvisation.
Clearly, patients’ pressure to receive those drugs col-
ides head-on with their high price and the existing budget
onstraints.However,National Strategic PlanonHCV infec-
ion came only last March 2015, though some of the drugs
ave been marketable in Europe since 2013 and the con-
ecutive release of the others was already expected.
The works of the expert committee to introduce
ome rationality were developed against a background of
atients and family relentless mobilization and escalatingholders during the process.
media campaigning with regional elections held in May
2015 and general elections taking place in December 2015.
These circumstances have only helped to solidify the ear-
marked fund logic as the dominant approach to the matter,
deterring any reﬂection as to the opportunity costs in the
medium and long-run. Critics from the health economics
and public health perspectives are ﬂourishing to warn
about the imminent dangers of setting this precedent [26].
5. Expected outcomes
The dynamic bewilderment with pricing due to their
unpredictability, thewayprices could changeasmorepost-
approval evidence is gleaned on their effectiveness and
safety, and new drugs reach the market (as the swift waves
of new approvals have shown), in addition to the ensu-
ing short-lived validity of the ICER, could certainly make
decisions more difﬁcult.
Nevertheless, and given the high number of esti-
mated eligible patients for the approved indications (up to
175,000 patients in the current indication – see Box 1), the
budgetary impact appears to be a matter of much more
concern than their cost-effectiveness ratios when mak-
ing decisions about HCV drugs reimbursement in Spain. In
addition, while ACs were still in the process of performing
this impact analysis (no data has beenmade ofﬁcially avail-
able yet), the original dedicated funding scheme – loans
from the national administration at zero interest rate and
with a promise to exclude the derived expenditure from
the computing of deﬁcit in the regional accounts – has
abruptly shifted. In the aftermathof lastDecember national
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elections and subsequent interim until repetition in June
(close to 8 months of electoral campaigning mood in a
row), the Spanish government has been urged by Brus-
sels to acknowledge deviations from the committed public
deﬁcit reduction goals, and to implement correction meas-
ures. This change on the game rules seems to have left
ACs with no actual additional funds (the loans were not
transferred though credit was generated on the regional
accounts)while their expenditure hasmarkedly increased;
that could actually entail penalties from the Spanish trea-
sury on the grounds of exceeding the established regional
threshold deﬁcit.
If prices were based on added therapeutic value, would
the current bill be justiﬁed? Which other services would
they displace?Have opportunity costs been estimated both
inside and outside the SNS? Social efﬁciency is at stake.
Moreover, when approvals of other high-priced innova-
tive drugs such as some of those to treat cancer, neurologic
diseases or orphans are taken into account along with
the across-the-board budgetary cuts and the approved
progressive reduction of the health care expenses as a per-
centage of the GDP (some additional 0.8% GDP reduction
has been committed for the Fiscal Stability Programme
2015-18 and pharmaceutical expenditure has been capped
to GDP growth [27,28]), patients and the society at large
grow uneasy and their demands for ear-marked budgetary
items take centre stage. Given the speed at which new
high budget-impact drugs (such those against HCV infec-
tion or the recently approved alirocumab and eculizumab
for hypercholesteronemia) are being approved, what is the
risk of winding up with new earmarked funds? Are we on
the verge of allowing for the media to have more weight
on regulatory decisions than scientiﬁc evidence?
6. Conclusions: overall assessment of policy/issue –
expert opinion
Defraying exorbitant costs for a QALY is a socially bad
business. Installing and growing accustomed to drug bud-
get silos couldbemuchworse. Earmarked fundsmaydodge
economicevaluationanddeny theprinciple thathealth ser-
vices can be swapped for efﬁciency reasons and the notion
of opportunity costs. They also spur different medical soci-
eties and patient’s organizations to call for cookie-cutter
solutions for their own diseases, what may be already
underway in Spain. Whereas the UK NHS is reconsidering
its earmarked funds for cancer drugs [29], Spain appears to
be more than prone to create them.
HCV drugs do not run counter clockwise: between 15%
and40%of infectedpeople cure spontaneously, and in those
inwhich thediseaseprogresses, it does sovery slowly,what
allows for a precise control of its evolution. This makes
hasty decision-making untenable from a social efﬁciency
perspective [26].
However, the way decisions have been made seem to
be improvised: a piecemeal approach with almost total
disregard for sound planning and allocative and dynamic
efﬁciency, as well as the opportunity costs of the decisions
made. Such a bad precedent could, if generalized, jeopar-
dize the system sustainability.olicy 120 (2016) 975–981
Institutional behaviour changes when the (regula-
tory) rules of the game do so. Current opaque pricing
mechanisms used for new drugs should be replaced by
value-based pricing and well speciﬁed transparent rules.
Improvised public credits with zero interest rate amount-
ing to 700 million euros are not a solution at all, as neither
are unit costs that should be shunned and replaced by
cost-sharing schemes in which both risks and therapeu-
tic success are shared by payers and the pharmaceutical
industry.
Good regulation means, inter alia, applying appropriate
evidentiary standards for approval (relative efﬁcacy and
safety, incremental cost-effectiveness, and sound budget
impact analysis). It also includes ensuring the generation of
information needed for regulatory decision making. It fos-
ters patients and citizens’ participation indecision-making,
strengthens law enforcement, enhances the purchaser
faced with a monopolistic supplier, and factors uncertainty
into the negotiation agenda (value of information and risk
sharing).
The merry-go-round of approval, pricing and reim-
bursement of drugs against the chronic HCV infection in
Spain is a consequence of a secular deﬁcit of the SNS: the
high prevalence of poor public governance standards. The
process has precluded the required transparency, has obvi-
ated any ex ante joint agreement between the Ministry of
Health and its regional counterparts, and has avoided an
open and honest debate with professionals, citizens and
patients about the beneﬁts and harms of silo-wise think-
ing. For any upcoming similar situation, all these elements
should be guaranteed.
Finally, upon that premise, decision-making mecha-
nisms on approval, pricing, coverage and reimbursement
should move from the current system to a dynamic value-
basedmethodology, shifting theprice of thenewmolecules
as themagnitudeof the relative (incremental) effectiveness
and safety (and innovativeness) of the new drugs’ changes.
Validated and internationally accepted tools are available
to do so.
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